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We estimate probit models to investigate the determinants of the
incidence of four performance-based compensation schemes -- employee
share purchase plans, profit sharing, cash bonuses, and productivity
gainsharing -- using a sample of private sector Canadian firms.
Bivariate probit models are also estimated to examine the joint
probability that both a cash-based and a share-based scheme will be
offered. We find that the determinants of the probability that ‘a firm
.
would offer a scheme differed across schemes, and for a given scheme,
often differed for the broad class of non-managerial workers and for
production workers alone. Our primary focus is on the effect of
unionizatioh on the incidence of the schemes. This reflects the
widespread notion that unions oppose these sorts of performance based
compensation plans. Except for productivity gainsharing and one
instance of cash bonuses, we find that the effect of union density was
negative as expected and often significantly so. The estimated
probability effect is large for employee share purchase plans and profit
sharing for production workers. In addition, unionization has a fairly
substantial effect on the joint probability of the firm offering both a
share-based and a cash-based incentive plan. Finally, we find some
support for the notion that firms adopt these policies to reward past
performance.1. INTRODUCTION
Recently, alternative labor compensation schemes such as profit and
value added sharing, employee share ownership plans, and productivity
gainsharing which link part of employee compensation to the performance
of the firm have received considerable attention by economists, labor
relations specialists, and policy makers. Interest in these
alternatives partly reflects the disappointing economic performance of
some industrial nations during the past decade and a perception that
many industries were losing their ability to compete with foreign firms.
Performance-based compensation has been recommended as a remedy for
these problems because it is viewed by its proponents as a means to
enhance worker pr0ductivity.l While most empirical studies have found
positive productivity effects of alternative compensation schemes,' for
many incentive schemes the evidence is still preliminary and a strong
case that all forms of performance-based compensation improve
productivity does not yet exist.
Alternative compensation schemes have experienced rapid growth in
the United States, Great Britain, and Canada in recent years and are now
offered by a significant number of firms.' In Canada, which is the focus
of this study, labor compensation practices were radically transformed
by the 1981-82 recession (Booth (1987)). Prior to that recession, most
firms used general pay increases rather than merit pay or group
incentive systems. Now, the "dominant" practice in a majority of firms
is to use a merit-only system to determine the compensation of nonunion
workers (Booth (1987)). The use of group incentive schemes has also
increased. In 1986 bonuses and profit sharing on average represented
13.1% of total payroll costs for Canadian firms, compared to 1 7% in
1984. Employee share ownership in Canada has also experienced rapid
growth, and by July 1986, 23% of firms listed on the Toronto Stock
Exchange offered their employees share purchase plans (Toronto Stock
Exchange (1987)). The Canadian experience is particularly interesting
because the "phenomenal growth" of these plans was not supported by the
sort of tax incentives available to some U.S. employee stock ownership
plans (ESOPs) and to some British share ownership schemes.
The purpose of this paper is to investigate the determinants of the
incidence among Canadian firms of four incentive schemes: employee share
purchase plans, profit sharing, cash bonus plans, and productivity
gainsharing. For each plan, we use a sample of private sector Canadian
firms to estimate probit equations for the probability that the firm
offers its non-managerial workers the plan. In addition, we estimate
separate probit equations for the firm's production workers. Finally,
bivariate probit models are estimated to examine the joint probability
that a firm offers its workers both a share purchase plan and a  cash-
based incentive scheme. We focus on the relationship between union
density and the incidence of the plan because it is widely believed that
unions oppose group incentive schemes. (For example, see Smith (1988),
Mitchell (1987), and Gregg and Machin (1988)). In addition to being the
first econometric study of the determinants of the incidence of these
plans in Canada, this paper advances existing work by investigating this
issue for production workers alone as well as for all non-managerial
employees and by examining the joint incidence of cash-based and share-
based schemes.The plan of this paper is as follows. In the next section, we
review some past research on performance-based compensation schemes.
Section 3 contains a description of the data upon which the subsequent
empirical analysis is based. In the following section, we specify the
univariate and bivariate probit models used to investigate the incidence
of different types of schemes. We present our empirical results in
section 5 and offer concluding comments in section 6.
2. PERJ?OFMANCE-BASED COMPENSATION \
\
There has been little rigorous theoretical work on the incidence of
group incentive schemes to guide our empirical work. Although the
theoretical literature for individual incentives is considerably richer,
its main relevance of our study is to suggest conditions under which a
group incentive scheme might be adopted rather than an individual
incentive scheme. We begin by outlining a framework to explain the
firm's choice of compensation scheme and conclude this section with a
review of some empirical work.
The decision of a firm to offer one or more performance-based
compensation schemes can be viewed as the outcome of an explicit or
implicit bargain between the firm and its employees or their union
representatives. (For example, see Cable (1988) for a brief overview
that includes an extension of this framework to include the degree of
worker participation in decision making as well as the form of
compensation.) The outcome of the bargain will reflect the objectives
of employers and workers (or the union), the effects of the schemes on
the economic performance of the firm and on the utility of its workers,and the relative bargaining strength of the firm and its workers (or
their collective voice -- the union). This sort of framework suggests
that firm characteristics (e.g., the nature of the production process),
worker characteristics (e.g., their skill levels) along with a measure
of the relative strength of the firm and its workers would determine the
probability that the firm offers its workers a performance-based
compensation scheme.
The most often cited benefit to a firm for choosing a performance-
based compensation scheme is that productivity will be enhanced:>\ The
reasons offered for a positive productivity effect are varied. They
include: lower absenteeism and labor turnover, greater investment in
firm-specific human capital, more individual effort, greater teamwork
among workers, and a cooperative rather than adversarial relationship
between workers and management. However, critics argue that group
schemes will not induce greater effort unless the group is very small
because each worker has an incentive to free ride.4 Additionally, both
individual and group incentives schemes impose costs on the firm that
may outweigh the benefits from higher productivity. For example, both
individual piece rates and merit pay involve monitoring costs (Brown
(1989)). Group incentives such as profit sharing and productivity
gainsharing require the firm to persuade its workers that the
performance measure is fair and has not been tampered with by the firm.
Finally, by linking part of a worker's income to either the individual's
performance or that of the firm, incentive schemes increase the
variability of income that may require the firm to pay a "compensating
differential" (Seiler (1984)).For those firms that decide to adopt performance-based
compensation, there is also the choice of which scheme or schemes to
use. For example, group incentives might be a substitute for individual
incentives. In particular, group incentives such as profit sharing and
productivity gainsharing might be used in place of an individual
incentive when the cost of monitoring each worker's output is too high.
Empirical evidence on the incidence of performance-based
compensation has yielded some conflicting results, including the effect
of unionization. Gregg and Machin (1988) investigated the relationship
b
between unionization and share ownership, profit sharing, and value
added sharing in British establishments. Separate probit equations were
estimated for each type of scheme. They found that unionization
increases the probability of the establishment having profit sharing or
share ownership, while reducing the probability of value added sharing.
However, the positive effect on the probability of profit sharing and
share ownership is smaller if the union is strong (proxied by whether
some members are in a closed shop). In addition, the authors found that
share ownership is largely determined by firm variables, while value
added sharing is largely explained by establishment variables. Both
types of variables explained profit sharing.
In a study of the effects of newly organized unions on labor
practices and compensation, Freeman and Kleiner (19881, using a logit
model, found that union organizing drives decreased the probability of
an establishment offering its workers profit sharing. However, this
effect was not significant for any of their measures of the outcome of
the organization drive -- a union contract, a union victory in a NLRB
5election without a contract, or a NLRB election defeat.
Conte and Svejnar (1989) use an unbalanced panel of 64 U.S. firms
to estimate probit models to explain the incidence of profit sharing and
both tax deduction and tax credit ESOPs. Unionized firms were less
likely to offer tax deduction ESOPs and profit sharing plans; the effect
of unionization on the incidence of tax credit ESOPs was insignificant.
All three plans were inversely related to financial performance of the
firm. Firm size increased the probability of a firm offering one of the
ESOPs, while a low capital-labor ratio and high average pay  (pr‘axie_d by
the industry average) increased the incidence of profit sharing.
Evidence on the incidence of two individual incentives -- merit pay
and piece rates -- is provided in Brown (1989). He estimated regression
models to explain the proportion of production workers paid by
individual incentives (predominately piece rates) and by standard time
rates using a sample of 3169 U.S. establishments in ten manufacturing
industries. Coverage of workers by a union increased the proportion of
workers paid by standard rates at the expense of workers paid under a
merit system, reflecting the opposition of unions to discretionary pay
systems. The size of an establishment increased the use of both
individual incentives and standard rates, which is consistent with
Brown's monitoring cost hypothesis.
3. DATA
The data used in this study are based on three surveys of Canadian
companies conducted by a private research organization in the summers of
1985, 1986, and 1987. Our sample consists of 477 private sector firms'
6-- 313 firms participated in the 1987 survey; the remaining 164 firms
are from the 1986 survey.6 None of these 164 firms participated in the
1987 survey. Although some of the 313 firms from the 1987 survey are
repeats from the previous year's survey, we excluded the 1986
observations on these firms because two observations on the same firm
are probably correlated, which would invalidate some of our statistical
results.'
While the surveys lack information on characteristics of the firm's
labor force such as education and skill levels, an important advantage
of the data is that, most unusually, eligibility for performance-based
compensation is reported separately by employee group (i.e., executives,
managers and professionals, technical and supervisory, clerical and
support, and production workers) .* Our empirical work was confined to
technical, supervisory, clerical, support, and production workers
because these are the workers that most analysts of alternative
compensation schemes seem to have in mind,
Moreover, five different performance-based compensation schemes
were included in the surveys. One, stock options/stock grants, was
largely limited to executives, managers and professionals, and
consequently, was not investigated in this study. For each scheme,
firms reported which employee groups were eligible for that scheme or
if they plan to introduce the scheme soon. Since the 1986 survey did
not distinguish between plans in existence and those that were to be
implemented, a firm (from either survey) was considered to have a plan
in either case.To complement the information on features of the plans in the
surveys, we will summarize some findings on performance-based
compensation in Canadian companies reported by Booth (1987).9 Profit
sharing, cash bonuses, and productivity gainsharing are predominately
cash-based schemes;" share purchase plans are, of course, share-based.
The vast majority of firms that have either profit sharing or share
purchase plans make all employees in an employee group eligible whenever
the plan is offered to some members of that group. Universal
eligibility is less common for productivity gainsharing (especially \
among production workers) and cash bonuses. Finally, share Purchase
plans, profit sharing, and productivity gainsharing are incentive plans
based on the performance of a group (e.g., company or production unit).
Cash bonus .plans may include an individual's performance as one of the
performance measures and, therefore, may be more of an individual rather
than a group incentive. But the surveys that were used in our study
explicitly defined cash bonus plans to exclude merit and regular pay
increases, and therefore, it is reasonable to assume that most of the
cash bonus schemes in our study do have a group incentive component.
The degree to which eligibility within an employee group is
universal is important because our unit of observation is the firm
rather than the establishment. The relative widespread eligibility for
both share ownership and profit sharing is consistent with the decision
to offer these plans being made at the firm rather than at the
establishment level." This suggests that the firm is perhaps the
appropriate unit of analysis for these schemes,12 and moreover, the use
of establishment data that contains multiple establishments from the
8same company might pose econometric problems arising from both the
correlation of observations from the same firm and the omission of firm
characteristics.13
Table 1 contains summary statistics for the variables used
estimate our probit models. (Detailed descriptions of the variables




sample, the summary statistics should not be interpreted as estimates of
the corresponding parameters for the population of Canadian firms.
(Most important, we are not aware of reasons why dispropo?tionate
sampling of larger firms should bias the probit estimates reported
below.) Eligibility for employee share purchase plans (SP), profit
sharing (PS), cash bonuses (CB), and productivity gainsharing (PG) is
given for‘ "non-managerial" employees (i.e., excluding executives,
managers, and professionals) and for production workers separately
(SP.PR, PS.PR, CB.PR, and PG.PR). We also report separate descriptive
statistics for firms with and without a share purchase plan for its non-
managerial workers and for firms with and without one of the three
predominately cash-based plans (CASHl) for these workers.
Table 1 reveals a number of interesting characteristics of our
sample of firms, First, eligibility for employee share purchase plans
is quite prevalent; these plans are offered to workers at 37% of the
firms. The incidence of profit sharing and cash bonuses is much more
modest, while productivity gainsharing schemes are available at only 6%
of the firms in our sample. Second, as expected, production workers are
often not eligible for employee share ownership, profit sharing, and
cash bonus plans even when these plans are available to technical,
9supervisory, clerical or support workers. In contrast, productivity
gainsharing is primarily aimed at production workers. The disaggregated
data given in the last four columns indicate that firms that offer
either a share-based or a cash-based plan differ from firms that do not
have that type of plan. For example, firms that offer their non-
managerial workers a share purchase plan are on average larger and less
unionized. Firms that offer their non-managerial workers one of the
three cash-based plans are on average smaller and less unionized.
In Table 2 we report summary information on
the four plans. (Additional descriptive measures
Most firms offer (some of) their non-managerial
of the four incentive plans. Multiple plans
workers at. 16% of the firms. In light of
the joint incidence of
\
are given in Table 8.)
employees at least one
are offered to these
the incidence of the
individual plans, it is not surprising that the joint incidence of plans
is lower for production workers than for other non-managerial workers.
4. EMPIRICAL SPECIFICATION
Since our dependent variables are dichotomous, we specify probit
models for each of the four performance-based compensation schemes
studied in the paper.15 These models specify the probability that some
non-managerial employees (or alternatively production workers) are
eligible for the plan to be a function of a vector of firm
characteristics. Specifically, let Ylj be a binary variable that assumes
the value of 1 if the ith firm offers the j'" scheme, j = SP, PS, CB, and
PG (or analogously for production workers). Thus, we assume for the s""
firm that
10Pr(Y,, = 1) = F(xlPj) j=SP,PS,CB,PG (1)
where xl is a vector of explanatory variables; p, is a vector of unknown
coefficients, which are specific to the j'" scheme; and F(.) is the
standard normal cumulative distribution function. The interpretation of
each of these probit equations is that it gives the marginal probability
of the firm offering the scheme.
The probit specification implies that the (marginal) effec<%pf.the
kth explanatory variable, x~, on the probability that the scheme will be
offered is given by
aPr(Y=l)/Jx,  = f(x'p)*Pk (2)
where f(.) is the density function of a standard normal variable and
where we have suppressed the subscripts i and j to simplify the
notation. One implication of (2) is that the Pr's only indicate the sign
of the effect of the corresponding variable on the probability of the
scheme. In addition, (2) implies that comparisons of coefficients
either across specifications (choices of x) or across models of
different schemes can give misleading results.
To examine the determinants of the joint probability that two
schemes are simultaneously offered, we specify bivariate probit models.
The bivariate probit specification is given by
Pr(Yij = 1 and Yih = 1) = G(x:p,,x;P&) (3)
11where G is the bivariate standard normal distribution function with
correlation coefficient p.'" Given that the marginal probabilities of Yj
and Y, are specified by (11, the joint probability given by (3) is
sufficient to determine the remaining three joint probabilities. The
unknown coefficients,p, and Phi are the same as the corresponding
coefficients in the univariate probit specifications given by (1). In
general, this implies that estimating the bivariate probit models would
yield estimators that are more (asymptotically) efficient than those
obtainable by estimating the two univariate probit equations. However,
when p is close to zero the univariate probit estimators of pj and &, are
likely to be better than the bivariate probit estimators.
Since' it is computationally infeasible to estimate multivariate
probit models that are more complicated that the bivariate model, we
will focus on three sets of bivariate re1ationships.l' One will be the
joint probability of share ownership and profit sharing schemes. The
other two involve aggregating the predominately cash-based schemes into
one scheme and investigating the joint probability of the cash-based
aggregate and the share ownership plan. Two alternative aggregates are
used: CASH1 which aggregates all three cash-based plans and CASH2 which
includes just profit sharing and cash bonuses.
For each scheme and for each type of worker (all non-managerial
workers and production workers) we estimate four specifications. These
specifications will allow us to explore alternative hypotheses as well
as to use the maximum number of available observations to estimate each
model. In choosing the explanatory variables we draw upon previous
12empirical work, the information available in the surveys, and our
theoretical preconceptions. The variables common to all specifications
are union density (UNION), two measures of size (LN(LABOR) and NATION),
BENEFIT, the capital-labor ratio (KLRATIO), and industry dummy
variables. Since our data on assets for firms in the finance,
insurance, and real estate industries (FIN) are not comparable to the
asset data for the other firms in our sample, we imposed the constraint
that the coefficient on KLRATIO is zero for FIN industry firms and
included the FIN dummy variable to pick up some of the effects of the
\
capital intensity of the industry. We also include dummy variables
indicating if the firm is primarily in a manufacturing industry (MANUF)
or in a service industry (SERV). The coefficients on these dummy
variables are to be interpreted relative to firms in the OTHER industry.
Since finance industry firms are part of the service industry, the
coefficient on FIN indicates how FIN industry firms differ from other
service industry firms as well as the effect of the firms' capital
intensities.
Since unions are believed to oppose performance-based compensation,
we expect that the coefficient on UNION will be negative. (However, as
we noted above, the empirical evidence on this hypothesis is mixed.) An
additional reason to expect this is that firms with low union density
might offer these plans to discourage the growth of unionization. As
Fiorito, Lowman, and Nelson (1987) argue, firms often adopt human
resource policies as a substitute for unionization rather than attempt
to suppress unions. Moreover, Kochan, McKersie, and Chalykoff (1986),
claim that a firm is more likely to engage in union avoidance strategies
13when it is not highly unionized.
There are three reasons to presume that the effect of firm size on
the incidence of the group incentive plans to be positive. First, fixed
administrative costs can be spread over more workers in larger firms.l*
Second, share ownership (and to a lesser extent other group incentives)




Finally, large firms and, perhaps more important, large
might substitute group incentives for a merit pay system
of monitoring the individual worker is high. ,To help
separate the effects of firm size and establishment size, we will use
NATION in conjunction with firm employment to provide a crude measure of
the average size of the firm's establishments. Specifically, we will
assume that for a given level of firm employment, on average a national
employer has smaller establishments than other firms.
The effects of the remaining variables are in general ambiguous. To
the extent that KLRATIO represents machine-paced production methods, one
might expect that both individual and group incentives are less
important. However, as Brown (1989) discusses, this is one of a number
of features of the firm's production process captured by a measure such
as KLHATIO. BENEFIT is a crude proxy for the level of compensation and
various worker characteristics. As a measure of compensation, it should
have a positive effect on the incidence of performance-based pay if risk
aversion declines with income. As a proxy for average worker skill
level, it is not clear what sign should be expected.
In an attempt to improve upon BENEFIT as a measure of compensation,
we augmented the first specification with SAL.l' Unfortunately, salary
14data are unavailable for many of the firms in the sample, and
consequently, the addition of SAL reduces the number of observations
available to estimate the probit equations Also, one might expect a
potential simultaneity problem arising from SAL being reduced because of
incentive payments: higher total compensation, but lower salaries. In
practice, this may not be a serious problem because Booth (1987)
reported that in her sample of firms the average incentive and bonus
payments for non-managerial employees was 4% of compensation.
The third specification adds to the first model three measures of
the state of the firm's labor relations (broadly defined) - - LABREL,
TURNOVER, and PERFORM. Firms might view performance-based compensation
as a remedy for unsatisfactory labor relations, high turnover, or
unsatisfactory performance. Thus, one might expect positive
coefficients on LABREL and TURNOVER and a negative coefficient on
PERFORM. Alternatively, as indicated by the results of a survey of
British employers on their employee share purchase schemes reported in
Dewe, Dunn, and Richardson (19881, managers might introduce
performance-based compensation schemes to reward good past performance,
implying that the expected signs of the coefficients are opposite to
those specified above. A second reason to expect that good labor
relations will promote the adoption of these schemes is that their
potential productivity effects are more likely to be realized in a
cooperative rather than adversarial setting." Since the free rider
problem of group incentive schemes is often diminished in a repeated
game model, low turnover may increase the probability of adoption. In
addition, low turnover should promote the greater use by employees of
15employee share purchase schemes, and therefore, encourage its adoption.
Since firms with union-management conflicts might be more likely to
identify labor relations as a top priority, LABREL also serves as a
second measure of union strength. Finally, it should be noted that
insofar as these schemes lower turnover and improve labor relations and
performance, there is a potential simultaneity problem.'l Thus one
should view the results of the specifications augmented with the labor
relations variables with some caution.
The fourth and final specification is obtained from the ;hird by
adding SAL. As before, this reduces the number of observations
available to estimate the probit models.
5. EMPIRICAL RESULTS
We begin with the maximum likelihood estimates of the univariate
probit models, which are reported in Tables 3-6.22 Our discussion of the
determinants of the individual schemes are based on these results rather
than the coefficient estimates of the bivariate probit models because we
were never able to reject the hypothesis that p = 0 when the bivariate
model was specified for two of the individual schemes.*' In Table 7, we
report the effect of the union density variable on the probability that
each performance-based compensation scheme is offered for each model.
These probability effects are computed two ways. First,aPr/&JNION,
which is computed from (2) where the density function is evaluated at
the mean values of the explanatory variables and p is replaced by its
estimate. This strictly holds only for marginal changes in UNION.
Consequently, we report a second measure, APr, which is computed from
16(1) by replacing p by its estimate and evaluating the expression first
at the mean values of the explanatory variables and then at mean values
of all variables except UNION which is set to zero. APr is the
difference of the two expressions.24 All references in the text to
probability effects refer to this second measure.
Two general conclusions emerge from Tables 3-6. First, different
schemes appear to be affected by the factors under investigation in
different ways. In particular, the sign and significance of the union
density variable varies across schemes. In addition, the explanatory
power of the model as measured by the model x2 statistic varies
considerably across schemes." Second, the results for production
workers alone often differs from the corresponding results for all
non-managerial employees. If this finding generalizes to other data
sets, one should be cautious in how one interprets the results of probit
(or logit) estimates that aggregate all workers into one broad class
such as non-managerial workers if one's interest is in a narrower group
of workers.
We begin our discussion of the individual schemes with employee
share purchase plans (Table 3). We find that union density has a
negative and significant effect on the probability that the firm will
offer the scheme to some of its non-managerial workers or to some of its
production workers. Moreover, the estimated probability effect is
fairly substantial (Table 7). If union density were to rise from zero
to its sample mean, the probability of a share purchase plan is
estimated to decrease by 8% to 18% for all non-managerial workers and by
9% to 15% for production workers.
17Union density appears to be only one of the factors determining the
incidence of share purchase plans. The size of the firm (proxied by
LN(LABOR)) has a positive and significant effect in all eight probit
equations. Given the administrative costs of the plan (Toronto Stock
Exchange (1987)), this is not an unexpected finding. BENEFIT is
positive and often significant at least at the 10% level; while SAL is
uniformly insignificant.26 For SP, KLRATIO is positive and significant
in two of the four models; it is never significant when SP.PR is the
dependent variable. The coefficients on the labor relations variables
often enter with incorrect signs if these plans are viewed as remedies
to less than acceptable labor relations. None of these coefficients is
significant at the 10% level. Moreover, likelihood ratio tests for the
joint significance of all three labor relations variables do not reject
the null hypothesis for either dependent variable in any instance.27
The estimated probit models for profit sharing (Table 4) tell a
different story than those for share purchase plans. If we consider the
results for non-managerial employees when the labor relations variables
are omitted, we find that none of the explanatory variables other than
the industry dummy variables is individually significant and that a test
of their joint significance does not reject the null hypothesis.28  In
particular, union density is not significant at conventional levels.
However, the estimated probability effects are modest. When we augment
the model with the three labor relations variables, the coefficients on
TURNOVER and PERFORM are each significant at least at the 10%
significance level when SAL is omitted. (In addition, they are jointly
significant at the 10% leve1.)2g However, the signs of the coefficients
18on the three labor relations variables do not tell a consistent story.
The coefficients on LABREL and TURNOVER are consistent with an
explanation of profit sharing as a remedy for poor labor relations,
while the coefficient on PERFORM suggests that profit sharing is
introduced to reward the firm's workers if they are performing well.
A different picture emerges when we study the incidence of profit
sharing among production workers (PS.PR) separately. In all four
specifications, union density has a negative and significant effect on
the probability that some production workers will have profit sharing.
\
However, the magnitudes of the probability effects are fairly large
relative to the proportion of firms that offer their production workers
profit sharing (Table 7); if union density rises from 0 to its sample
mean, the probability of adopting profit sharing decreases by 4.7% to
7.2% depending upon the specification. Among the remaining controls
NATION, BENEFIT, KLRATIO, and PERFORM are often significant.30 Again
PERFORM has a positive coefficient, thereby suggesting that profit
sharing is a reward for good performance. The coefficient on NATION is
consistent with the hypothesis that larger establishments will
substitute profit sharing for merit pay.
The results for cash bonuses are given in Table 5. The model x2
statistics are significant at the 10% level in only three of the eight
cases. This may reflect that our unit of observation is the firm and
that the decision to offer these bonuses are often made at the
establishment level. Union density is not significant in any
specification when the dependent variable is for non-managerial
employees (CB). In fact, the point estimate is positive in the last
19model. However, it is significant when we estimate the model for
production workers and exclude SAL.31 All probability effects of union
density variables are small or modest. The probability of a cash bonus
plan is inversely related to the size of the firm (LN(LABOR)) and this
effect is significant when CB is the dependent variable. Since cash
bonus may have an individual incentive component (see above), this
inverse relationship may be consistent with the monitoring hypothesis
for merit pay. The performance variables are neither individually nor
collectively significant when CB is the dependent variable. For
production workers, TURNOVER is the one significant labor relations
variable; its coefficient is negative in both specifications.
The productivity gainsharing results are the least satisfactory
(Table 6) : Since only two firms in the service industry had
gainsharing, we were able to estimate probit equations only for the
subsample of firms excluding those in the service industry. The model x2
statistics are low and the null hypothesis of joint significance of the
explanatory variables is never rejected in any case. Since the probit
results are based on a sample in which at most 16 firms had productivity
gainsharing plans, one cannot expect precise estimates of its
determinants. In addition, the use of firm data rather than
establishment data may be inappropriate here. Unlike most previous
results, union density has a positive effect in three cases. However,
it is significant only in the first model. The magnitude of the
probability effect is small (Table
examined for the other schemes, the
virtually zero and 2.8%.
7). For the sort of exercise
probability effect ranges between
20Table 8 summarizes some of our findings from estimating bivariate
probit models. First, the correlation coefficient, p, is significant
only when the broadly defined cash-based aggregate (CASHl) is used and
only for production workers.32 This implies that in the other cases the
joint probability of the cash-based and the share-based schemes is
simply the product of the respective marginal probabilities. More
precisely, a zero correlation coefficient implies that Y; and YL (which
are defined in footnote 16) are independently distributed random
variables. \
A second result that emerges from Table 8 is that the effect of
unionization on the joint probability of the share-based and the cash-
based schemes is fairly substantial relative to the modest actual joint
incidence of these schemes. This probability effect, which is given by
AJt Pr in Table 8, is computed from (3) by replacing pj, Ph, and p by
their estimates and evaluating the expression first at the mean values
of the explanatory variables and then at mean values of all variables
except UNION which is set to zero. AJt Pr is the difference of the two
expressions.
6. SUMMARY AND CONCLUSION
This paper presents results on the determinants of the incidence of
four performance-based compensation schemes -- employee share purchase
plans, profit sharing, cash bonuses, and productivity gainsharing --
using a sample of private sector Canadian firms. We find that the
determinants of the probability that a firm would offer a scheme
differed across schemes, and for a given scheme, often differed for the
21broad class of non-managerial workers and for production workers alone.
Thus, aggregation across different employee groups might yield
misleading results if one is interested in production workers.
Our primary focus is on the effect of unionization on the incidence
of the schemes. This reflects the widespread notion that unions oppose
these sorts of performance based compensation plans. Except for
productivity gainsharing and one instance of cash bonuses, we find that
the effect of union density was negative as expected and often
significantly so. The estimated probability effect is large for
employee share purchase plans and profit sharing for production workers.
In addition, unionization has a fairly substantial effect on the joint
probability of the firm offering both a share-based and a cash-based
incentive plan. Finally, we find some support for the notion that firms
adopt these policies to reward past performance.
22APPENDIX
TABLE Al. Definitions of Variables
SP = employee share purchase plan dummy variable. (SP = 1 if some
non-managerial employees are eligible to participate in the
plan.)*
PS = profit sharing dummy variable. (PS = 1 if some
non-managerial employees are eligible to participate in the
plan.)*
CB = annual cash bonus (excluding merit and regular increases)
dummy variable. (CB = 1 if some non-managerial employees are
eligible to participate in the plan.) * \
PG = productivity gainsharing dummy variable. (PG = 1 if some
non-managerial employees are eligible to participate in the
plan.)*
CASH1 = cash-based (broadly defined) dummy variable. (CASH1 = 1 if
some non-managerial employees are eligible to participate in
.one of the three predominately cash-based plans - - profit
sharing, annual cash bonus, or productivity gainsharing.) *
CASH2 = cash-based (narrowly defined) dummy variable. (CASH2 = 1 if
some non-managerial employees are eligible to participate in
either a profit sharing or an annual cash bonus plan.)*
SP.PR= employee share purchase plan for production workers dummy
variable. (SP.PR = 1 if some production workers are eligible
to participate in the plan.)*
PS.PR= profit sharing for production workers dummy variable. (PS.PR
= 1 if some production workers are eligible to participate in
the plan.) *
CB.PR= annual cash bonus (excluding merit and regular increases) for
production workers dummy variable. (CB.PR = 1 if some
production workers are eligible to participate in the plan.)*
PG.PR= productivity gainsharing dummy variable. (PG.PR = 1 if some
production workers are eligible to participate in the plan.)*
CASHl.PR = cash-based (broadly defined) for production workers
dummy variable. (CASHl.PR = 1 if some production
workers are eligible to participate in one of the three
predominately cash-based plans - - profit sharing,
annual cash bonus, or productivity gainsharing.)"














dummy variable. (CASH2.PR = 1 if some production
workers are eligible to participate in either a profit
sharing or an annual cash bonus plan.)*
manufacturing industry dummy variable (MANUF = 1 if the firm
is primarily engaged in manufacturing).
service industry dummy variable (SERV = 1 if the firm is
primarily engaged in a service industry).
finance industry dummy variable (FIN = 1 if the firm is
primarily engaged in finance, insurance, or real estate).
other industries dummy variables (OTHER = 1 if the firm is
primarily engaged in industries, such as agriculture,
logging, or forestry, fishing, mining, transportation,
construction, communication, telecommunication, or 'bpublic
utilities).
= union density = (i.e., proportion of workers who are
unionized) .*
total employment (full and part-time workers) .*
‘Z national employer dummy variable (NATION = 1 if the firm
is a national rather than a regional or provincial
employer.)
= total benefit costs as a percentage of gross annual
payroll.*
simple average of the average salary of (non-unionized)
technical and supervisory workers and the average salary of
(non-unionized) clerical and support workers in thousands of
1987 dollars.
= capital-labor ratio (total assets/labor) in millions of
1987 dollars per worker.*
= a labor relations dummy variable (LABREL = 1 if the firm
identified labor relations as one of its top four human
resource management priorities in 1987 or top three in
1986. There are 24 possible areas that could be
selected in 1987 and 26 in 1986 including those related
to compensation and benefits.)
= voluntary turnover rate (percent) .*
= average performance of workers. (On the basis of a five
level performance rating scale, the firm identified the
proportion of its employees at each level. PERFORM is a
weighted average of the firm's ratings. Note: 3 =
satisfactory performance.)*
24Notes: 1. For variables marked by an asterisk, when data were missing
for 1987 or 1986, 1986 or 1985 data were used if available.
2. Non-managerial employees = technical, supervisory, clerical, staff,
or production workers. (It excludes executives, managers, and
professionals.)
3. A firm was considered to have a plan for a given type of worker if
either that plan were available to those workers or if the firm was
going to introduce the plan for those workers soon.
4. CASH1 was coded as 1 if either PS, CB, or PG were equal to 1. It
was coded as 0 if PS = CB = PG = 0. In all other cases it was coded as
missing. (CASHl.PR was coded in an analogous fashion.1
5. CASH2 was coded as 1 if either PS or CB were equal to 1. It was
coded as 0 if PS = CB = 0. In all other cases it was coded as missing.
(CASH2.PR was coded in an analogous fashion.) .
6. All nominal variables for 1986 were converted to 1987 Canadian
dollars using an index of industry selling prices. (Source:
International Monetary Fund, International Financial Statistics,
February, 1989.)
7. If salary data for an employee group were missing for 1987, data on
1988 planned compensation or data on 1987 planned compensation (from the
1986 survey) for that group were used as follows. When available,
anticipated average 1988 base salary was deflated by the anticipated
midpoint of the range of salary increases. If this data were missing,
data from the 1986 survey on anticipated average 1987 salary were used.
8. If salary data for an employee group were missing for 1986, then
data on anticipated 1987 average salary for that group were used.
25FOOTNOTES
'Interest in profit sharing has also been stimulated by the work of
Weitzman (e.g., 1984 and 1986), who argued
widely adopted, the economy would exhibit a
to aggregate demand and supply shocks.
that if profit sharing were
smaller employment response
'See Estrin, Grout and Wadhwani (1987), Weitzman and Kruse (1989),
or Jones and Pliskin (1989) for surveys. .
b
'For U.S. employee stock ownership plans (ESOPs), see Conte and
Svejnar (1989); for British profit sharing, value added bonus plans,
and share ownership schemes, see Blanchflower and Oswald (1988).
4For a contrasting view that emphasizes the role of peer group
pressure to overcome the incentive to shirk, see Fitzroy and Kraft
(1986,1987).
'The econometric results reported in Tables 3-8 are based on fewer
firms because data are missing on some variables.
6Firms that appeared only in the 1985 survey were dropped because
that survey did not include information on firms' assets which was
needed to construct capital-labor ratios. Data from the 1985 survey
were used for firms in the 1986 and 1987 surveys if 1987 or 1986 data
were missing for certain variables.
'Our panel would be too short to estimate the panel data models
described in Maddala (1987) or Amemiya (1985).
'Unfortunately many of the firm characteristics (e.g., employment
and turnover) are not reported separately by employee groups.
26'This study was based on a survey that was completed by 157
organizations that were selected because they were believed to have one
or more incentive plans. Although the sample in the Booth study was not
random, it is not obvious that characteristics of the plans in this
sample would differ materially from those of the firms in our sample.
loThe form of payments for both cash bonus and productivity
gainsharing plans were exclusively cash-based, and in the vast majority
of firms this payment was current rather than deferred. Of the firms
with profit sharing, 92% were cash-based (62% were current and 1.5% were
L
a combination of current and deferred payments); the remaining 8% paid
workers their share of profits in the form of company stock.
'ISince the median number of employees of the firms in Booth's
sample was .2200 (the mean exceeded 5380 employees), many of these firms
likely operate multiple establishments.
120f course, this does not imply that average establishment
characteristics are irrelevant to the firm's decision to offer one of
the schemes.
131n contrast, the use of firm data to investigate cash bonuses and
productivity gainsharing is more problematic.
14The median employment level is 1060 full and part-time workers.
15An alternative to probit is logit. Since the cumulative
distribution functions underlying the probit and logit models are
similar except at the tails of the distribution (Maddala (1983) 1, the
two models typically yield similar results. Since some of our estimated
probit models yielded for some observations estimated probabilities that
were in the tail of the normal distribution, the choice between probit
27and logit is potentially important. However, we found that for our main
conclusions on the determinants of the incidence of the four schemes,
the logit results did not differ from the probit results given in the
paper.
16The relationship between the univariate probit equations (1) and
the bivariate probit equation (3) can be best seen by assuming that
there exist unobservable continuous variables Y; and YL that measure the
inclination of the firm to offer schemes j and h respectively. We
observe Y, = 1 if and only if Y; 2 0 and similarly for Y,. Moreover, it
/ .
is assumed that Y; = x'pj + &j and YL = x'Ph + E,,, where E, and E, are
bivariate standard normal random variables with correlation coefficient
P*
17The .bivariate probit model involves double integrals: a higher
order model involves at least triple integrals.
'*For share purchase plans, see Toronto Stock Exchange (1987).
lgThe sample correlation between BENEFIT and SAL is only about .2O,
which suggests that the former is not a strong proxy for the latter.
2oPoo1e (1988) found that financial participation by employees was
greater if the firm had a "consultative" industrial relations style. We
suspect that this sort of firm would be unlikely to have serious labor
relations difficulties.
'lIdeally, one would want to use the values of LABREL, TURNOVER, and
PERFORM prior to the firm adopting the schemes or adjusted for the
effects of the schemes by estimating a simultaneous equation model which
includes equations for LABREL, TURNOVER, and PERFORM. Data are not
available for the former, and it is not clear that we can specify
28equations for LABREL, TURNOVER, and PERFORM so that we would have
instrumental variables that can be used to correct for the simultaneity
problem.
22For each scheme except productivity gainsharing, we have reported
the results for both non-managerial employees and for production workers
alone. We are unable to do so for productivity gainsharing because each
firm that had complete data on the explanatory variables and
gainsharing plan, offered this plan to its production workers.
*IAn additional and clearly a secondary reason for us to




probit models are estimated over (a few) more observations than the
bivariate models. Given the insignificance of p, it is not surprising
that we often obtained estimated standard errors for the bivariate
probit models that were larger than the corresponding estimated standard
errors for the univariate
24For both measures,
to estimate the model.
probit specifications.
we use the variable means for the sample used
Although these means differ slightly across
models, the effects of these differences on the two measures is small.
**The model x2 statistic tests if all explanatory variables are
jointly significant. The model x2 statistic corresponds to the widely
reported F statistic of the conventional multiple regression model.
26When the probit equations were estimated over the subsample
excluding service industry firms, the t statistic on the coefficient or
BENEFIT typically rose. When we substituted the average salary of
technical and supervisory workers for SAL in the equations for SP, we
found that in the equation that omits the labor relations variables, the
29coefficient on salary was significant at the 5% level. This was the
only instance in both reported and unreported estimated models when a
measure of salary was significant.
"For SP the x2 statistics are 1.58 and 3.56 and for SP.PR the
statistics are 3.08 and 3.64. The critical values of the statistic with
three degrees of freedom is 6.25 at the 10% significance level and 7.82
at the 5% level.
'*The model x2 statistics are significant because of the industry
dummies. .
"The x2 statistic is 5.70 and the critical value with two degrees
of freedom is 4.605 at the 10% level.
3oIn Table 4 BENEFIT is significant at the 10% level for two of the
four models of PS.PR (i.e., the two that omit SAL). If the four
specifications are estimated over the subsample that excludes firms in
the service industry, BENEFIT is significant at the 10% level in all
four cases and at the 5% level for the two that omit SAL.
31When the probit equations were estimated over the subsample
excluding service industry firms, UNION became insignificant. In most
specifications, LNLABOR was significant (at least at the 10% level).
32The correlation coefficient was also insignificant when we
considered the joint probability of share ownership and cash bonus as
well as the joint probability of profit sharing and cash bonuses.
However, in some instances the estimated value of p was over .20.
























































































.29 -31 .26 .25 .34











.16 .14 .17 .16 .13
t.36) t.351 t.38) t.371 (-33)
.35 .36 .32 .38 .30
(.33) f.32) (.33) t.32) t.32)
3169 2463 4602 3581 2231
(8217) (8363) (8227) (9418) (4704)
.67 .64 .70 .66 -66
(.47) t.48) t.46) (.47) t.48)
24.7 24.1 25.5 24.6 24.6
(8.8) (8.4) (8.8) (8.7) (8.9)
29.7 29.0 30.9 29.8 29.8
(5.6) (5.4) (5.9) (5.3) (6.1)
.61 .45 .69 .68 .53
(2.2) (1.8) (1.8) (2.4) (2.1)
.28 .29 .25 .29 .27
















Notes: 1. All variables are defined in the Appendix.
2. NeaX is the maximum number of firms used to compute the
descriptive statistics. For some variables, the statistics are based
on fewer observations because of missing data.
3. The figures for KLRATIO exclude firms in the finance, real estate,
and insurance industries.TABLE 2. Joint Incidence of Plans
Percentage of Firms
Number of







Note: Percentages are based on the 433 firms which had complete























































































































































































358 246 304 225 358 246 304 225
-40 -41 .dl .d2 .28 -28 .28 .28
-219.17 -146.53 -180.83 -128.78 -194.74 -129.65 -158.16 -110.81
48.24 36.51 34.52 42.05 45.20 44.17 40.05 50.14
NOTE: Figures in parentheses are the absolute values of the (asymptotic)
t statistics.TABLE 4. PROBIT ESTIHATES OF THE PROFIT SEARING EQUATIONS
INDEPENDENT
VARIABLE PS PS PS
CONSTANT -.52 -.26 -3.12 -2.98





SERV .67 -67 .65 .69




































VARIABLE .16 .la .16 .17 -09 -11 -09 -11
LOG OF THE
LIKELIHOOD
FUNCTION -147.68 -105.16 -122.04
MODEL X2 la.17 17.29 24.77





























































































NOTE : Figures in parentheses are the absolute values of the (asymptotic)
































































































i.41) i-56) l.95) 1.83)
-.53 -.33 -.76 -.45
1.23) l.56) (1.42) f.66)
.
-.80 -.51 -1.24 "/  -;87
( 1.65) 1.88) (2.13) (1.25)






























-.12 -.19 -.17 -.19





225 359 246 307 225
.20 .21 .05 .05 .06 .05
-165.34 -119.04 -147.19 -110.59




























-66.83 -45.63 -53.88 -38.65
14.99 10.49 29.27 16.39
NOTE: Figures in parentheses are the absolute values of the (asymptotic)
t statistics.TABLE 6. PROBIT ESTIMATES OF THE PRODUCTIVITY GAINSHARING EQUATIONS
PG PG PC PC
CONSTANT -3.26 -4.59 -1.93 -4.58
(3.14) (2.961 (.86) (1.51)
.26 .54 .40 .68
l.76) (1.12) l-96) (1.26)
SERV
FIN







LN(LABOR) .lO .13 .13
t.951 l.96) (1.12)
NATION -.16 -08 -.29 .04
l.57) l.20) (.91) t.101
BENEFIT -02 .04 .008 .03





KLRATIO -.15 -.64 -.22 -.87











I 248 169 210 154
NEAN  OF
DEPENDENT





-57.26 -38.33 -49.13 -32.82
9.41 9.96 9.81 13.63
NOTE: Figures in parentheses are the absolute values of the (asymptotic)
t statistics.TABLE 7. EFFECT OF UNION DENSITY ON THE PROBABILITY OF THE PLAN
Dependent Variable Model aPr/aUNION APr
SP 1 -.24 -.078
SP 2 -.38 -.123
SP 3 -.31 -.097
SP 4 -.56 -.176
SP.PR 1 -.26 -.089
SP.PR 2 -.39 -.135
SP.PR 3 -.26 -.085

















PS.PR 1 -.lO -.047
PS.PR 2 -.14 -.066
PS.PR 3 -.lO -.050
PS.PR 4 -.14 -.072
CB 1 -.ll -.036
CB 2 -.03 -.009
CB 3 -.07 -.023


















variables of model 1 are MANUF, SERV, FIN (1) The explanatory .
UNION, LN(LABOR), NATION, BENEFIT, and KLRATIO. The additional
explanatory variables of models 2, 3, and 4 are: model 2-- SAL;
model 3-- LABREL, TURNOVER, PERFORM; model 4-- SAL, LABREL,
TURNOVER, PERFORM
(2) aPr/ aUNION is computed from equation 2 of the text where the
density function is evaluated at the mean values of the explanatory
variables (for that specification) and the probit estimates are
used in place of the unknown parameters.
(3) APr is the estimated effect on the probability that the plan
is offered when union density rises from zero to its sample mean.
(See the text for details.)TABLE 8. EFFECT OF UNION DENSITY ON THE JOINT PROBABILITY OF PLANS

























































































































































































Notes to table 8:
(1) Figures in parentheses are the absolute values
statistics.
of the (asymptotic) t
(2) Yodels i-4 are described in Note 1 of Table 7. ~. (3) B1 and BZ are the bivariate probit maximum likelihood estimates of the
coefficients on UNION for plan 11 and plan t2 respectively.
(4) Jt Pr is the proportion of the firms in the sample used to estimate the
bivariate probit  model that offered both plans.
(5) bJt Pr is the estimated effect on the joint probability of both plans
being offered when Union density rises from zero to its sample mean. (See the
text for details.)REFERENCES
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